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ABSTRACT 
Health economists often use discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to predict behavior, as actual market 
data is often unavailable. Manski (1990) argues that due to the incompleteness of the hypothetical 
scenarios used in DCEs, substantial uncertainty surrounds stated choice. Uncertainty can be 
decomposed into “resolvable” and “unresolvable”; the former is expected to become resolved in actual 
choice, as individuals collect further information. To enable its identification, Manski suggests 
eliciting subjective choice probabilities (ECPs) rather than discrete choices. We introduce the ECP 
approach in health economics and explore its convergent validity. The context is future physicians’ 
stated choices of job in rural general practice in Denmark. Our results are mixed, but show remarkable 
similarities in forecasting abilities, despite the ECP models being less econometrically demanding and 
relying on milder preference distributional assumptions. 
Keywords: Discrete choice experiments; elicited choice probabilities; resolvable uncertainty; quantile 
regression; rural general practice 
JEL classification: C31; C35; I11 
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1. Introduction  
Forecasting choice behavior in health economics is challenging because actual data is often 
unavailable. In order to derive estimates of health care demand and/or supply, health economists often 
resort to data derived from hypothetical choice scenarios. An increasingly popular way of doing this is 
by means of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) in which respondents select their favorite alternative 
between two or more hypothetical scenarios describing the available treatments, services or, in this 
case, general practices. Data collected in this manner are then used to estimate random utility models, 
based on specific assumptions on behavior, from which expectations of real choice behavior are 
forecast (see e.g. Brown et al. 2015, Meenakshi et al. 2012, Sivey et al. 2012, Lancsar et al. 2011). 
Manski (1990) argues that statements of choice intentions might not be good predictors of future 
behavior. This because respondents taking part in a hypothetical DCE are likely to be provided with 
only a subset of the information deemed subjectively relevant or even necessary to make a real-life 
choice. Manski (1999) referred to this limitation as DCEs suffering from “incomplete scenarios” and 
repeated what Fischhoff, Welch, and Frederick (1999) wrote “If needed detail is missing, then people 
may make it up.”  
Uncertainty generates a systematic divergence between hypothetical and actual choice. The divergence 
is caused by the necessarily incomplete information base provided to respondents when eliciting their 
choice intentions. This information gap causes what was termed “resolvable uncertainty” (Manski 
1999) where the term “resolvable” indicates that to make real life choices respondents expect (and are 
expected) to acquire further information in order to reduce the overall uncertainty. In our study, we 
deal with the preferences future physicians hold over types of employment as general practitioners 
(GPs) in a general practice in rural locations in Denmark. This is currently an important area of 
investigation as there is a severe shortage of GPs (Marchand and Peckham 2017). Also, it is likely that 
when junior doctors make actual job choices, they would further seek and process details about 
working conditions in different general practices. Hence, it is plausible to expect that once faced with a 
real choice scenario, respondents would have resolved some of the uncertainty surrounding the 
hypothetical choice context. Cognizant of this fact, analysts are faced by an extrapolation problem in 
which assumptions are likely to play a crucial role. However, the consequences of such information 
discrepancy and their impact on standard assumptions in the analysis of choice data have rarely been 
explored in the empirical literature.  
3 
 
In the standard DCE framework, the issue of incomplete scenarios is typically handled by assuming 
that what remains undescribed in the characterization of alternatives has no systematic effect on 
utilities of alternatives as evaluated by respondents, except perhaps by inflating error variance. Some 
studies report asking respondents to score how certain they are about their stated choice and they use 
this score in heteroskedastic choice models. Because of limitations in both cognitive effort in 
information processing and in experimental design dimensions, it is of course impossible to include all 
potentially salient characteristics of alternatives in a DCE setting. However, eliciting subjective choice 
probabilities could potentially overcome this issue, by allowing respondents to be explicitly uncertain 
about their stated subjective choice. This approach was first proposed by Manski (1999) and later 
applied by Blass et al. (2010) who also demonstrated its additional advantage in giving rise to 
specifications with estimations that are substantively less econometrically demanding, thereby giving 
rise to a claim of a more robust inference.  
The elicitation of subjective choice probabilities has only been applied in a few stated choice studies, 
and never in the area of health economics. Blass et al. (2010) show how the approach can empirically 
be applied to data on consumers’ preferences for the reliability of electricity services in Israel. 
Shoyama et al. (2013) used this approach for eliciting public preference for land-use scenarios in 
Kushiro watershed in northern Japan and find some divergence between willingness to pay (WTP) 
estimates obtained from standard DCE data and the alternative elicited choice probability (ECP) 
approach. In a working paper on lake recreation, Herriges, Bhattacharjee and Kling (2011) use the 
2009 Iowa Lake Survey to administer a split treatment in terms of information provision (low and 
high) and preference elicitation method (DCE versus ECP). They find significant differences between 
the two formats in terms of implied preferences for two hypothetical lake scenarios. More generally, 
subjective choice probabilities have recently been used within labor economics – studying e.g. the 
choices of major subjects by college students and income expectations in American households, 
although not in a choice experiment framework (Dominitz and Manski 1997, Arcidiacono et al. 2012; 
Wiswall and Zafar 2015).  
In this study we contribute to the sparse literature on this issue by examining the convergent validity of 
the DCE and the ECP approaches. We focus on the hypothesis that, when some resolvable uncertainty 
is allowed to be expressed by using subjective probabilities, the structure of utility differ from that 
underlying discrete choices where this uncertainty cannot be expressed. 
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Unlike previous studies using this approach, we sample a population of future medical doctors. 
Compared to the populations sampled in other studies, our respondents are extremely well-educated 
and have all  been exposed to academic training in the field of probabilities. We first analyze the data 
from the DCE using conventional approaches based on random parameter mixed logit (RPL) models 
of discrete choice. Then from the ECP using both RPL models and, following Blass et al (2010) the 
more robust least absolute deviations (LAD) regressions.  
2. Methods 
2.1. Stated discrete choices 
The underlying theory of DCE is based on Lancaster’s consumer theory (Lancaster 1966) and random 
utility theory (Luce 1959; McFadden 1974). The model specification most commonly applied in the 
parametric analysis of preferred choice responses is currently the mixed logit model. This is based on 
the random utility one can derive from each alternative i offered in the choice set (see Train 2009; 
Hensher and Greene 2003): 
𝑈"#$ = 𝑉(𝑥"#), 𝛽") + 𝜀"#).          (1) 
The individuals are denoted by n, while i denotes the alternative and t is the choice task in the 
sequence of T observed choices t=1,2,…,T. The indirect utility, V, is a function of the vector of 
attributes describing the attractiveness of jobs, 𝑥"#), and the associated vector of individual taste 
parameters, 𝛽". The utility component 𝜀"#) is unobserved by the researcher and hence assumed to be 
i.i.d. extreme-value distributed. The random utility specification implies that only part of the 
deterministic (indirect) utility function is known by the analyst, while the respondent/individual is fully 
aware of the exact level of utility (s)he will obtain from a given alternative. Following Train (2009), 
the probabilities of the mixed logit model can be described as integrals of the standard conditional logit 
function evaluated at different values of 𝛽" distributed according to a density function (the mixing 
distribution). This specification can be generalized to allow for a panel of t=1,…,T choices by the same 
respondent n. Thus, the respondent-specific vector of taste parameters may vary over the population of 
future physicians but are constant over the T choice occasions by the same physician. The joint 
unconditional choice probability for the sequence of T choices by respondent n in the sample, under 
the mixed logit assumption, becomes: 
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𝑃" = ∫ 2∏ 4
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∑ 56789:8;>?>
@A#BC D 𝑓(𝛽|𝜇, 𝜂)𝑑𝛽   (2) 
where f is the density distribution function for 𝛽" with a mean of 𝜇 and a variance-covariance of η, and 
λ is the scale parameter, which is typically normalized to unity to allow identification.  
In our case, all coefficient attributes describing the job option are assumed to follow a normal 
distribution, since these can be seen as desirable or undesirable, depending on respondents’ 
preferences. The coefficient for the income attribute, instead, is assumed to be fixed. For further detail 
of the RPL model see e.g. Train (2009).  
We also estimate the WTP estimates by taking the ratio of the estimated mean parameters. By keeping 
the income coefficient fixed, we avoid the issue of potentially undefined distributions of the WTP 
obtained from taking the ratio of two random coefficients with different underlying distributions – e.g. 
a normal and a log-normal distribution. Estimation of WTP enables us to compare the size of the 
estimates in the different models, and to avoid the issue of scale effects discussed in Swait and 
Louviere (1993). By using symmetric preference distributions and a fixed cost/income coefficient, the 
estimated mean WTPs are equivalent across mixed logit and LAD models. 
2.2. Elicited choice probabilities 
As noted above, stated choice analysis assumes that respondents know the value of the utility of each 
alternative—i.e. both V and ε—which make them able to identify the utility maximizing alternative in 
all stated choice tasks. As argued in the introduction, and as eloquently put forth by Manski (1999), 
this is rarely the case in a hypothetical scenario used to describe experimental choice situations. It 
stands to reason that there are descriptors of alternatives that respondents would find informative in 
real life choices but are left totally omitted or insufficiently described in the survey scenarios. When 
approaching real life decisions some of these would become known to respondents—our future 
physicians would expect to “resolve” at least some of the uncertainty present in the hypothetical 
scenarios of the survey when choosing a real job in general practice. They would also hold some 
subjective belief with regards to these “resolvable features”, with distributions that correlates with 
scenarios’ descriptors. So, following the random utility framework, but extending it to account for the 
uncertainty created by the incomplete alternative descriptions salient for individual utility, we can 
rewrite the utility function in (1) as: 
𝑈"#) = 	𝑉(𝑥"#), 𝛽") + 𝜀"#) = 𝑉(𝑥"#), 𝛽) + 𝜀"#)K + 𝜀"#)L       (3) 
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where 𝜀"#)L 	includes unresolvable uncertainty, which is treated as in the conventional random utility 
specification, instead, 𝜀"#)K 	is a factor related to idiosyncratic resolvable uncertainty. We assume here, 
for simplicity, that this is the only component of idiosyncratic randomness of utility coefficients, but it 
need not be so. The problem in stated preference experiments is that analysts will never come to the 
ex-post real choice situation as choices remains hypothetical at the moment of data analysis. This is 
why it seems important to know how to treat this type of resolvable uncertainty separately into the 
stated preference experiment format.  
Since 𝜀"#)K 	 is unknown to the decision maker at the moment of expressing the stated choice, we can no 
longer assume that (s)he has made a definite utility-maximizing selection when choosing between 
hypothetical alternatives. Instead one can more plausibly say that (s)he has made a selection according 
to a subjective assessment concerning which alternative will yield the largest utility (allowing for 
uncertainty across alternatives). Now—following Blass et al. (2010)—this can still be set up in a 
random utility framework. Suppose that individual n forms a subjective distribution on the values of 
𝜀"#) = 𝜀"#)K + 𝜀"#)L , which makes him/her capable of choosing alternative i at time t with a given 
subjective probability 𝑞"#). Assume that individual n has the utility function given by eq. 3, and given 
the attributes in V, as represented in the vector 𝑥"#$, places a subjective distribution 𝑄"#	on 𝜀"#), then 
we can write the subjective choice probability for individual n choosing alternative i over j in choice 
situation t as:  
𝑞"#) = 𝑄"#O𝑥"#)𝛽" + 𝜀"#)L > 𝑥"#Q𝛽" + 𝜀"#QL ,			𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑖 ≠ 𝑗Y      (4) 
The subjective distribution 𝑄"# reflects the resolvable uncertainty in a hypothetical stated choice 
situation, which is unknown at that stage, but will become known in the actual choice situation. Hence, 
to point out the salient difference between stated choice (which only allows for unresolvable 
uncertainty) and elicited choice probabilities (that allows for both resolvable and unresolvable 
uncertainty) imagine that when respondent n states that (s)he will choose alternative i over j – in the 
elicited choice based on subjective probability format, this means that 𝑞"#) ≥ 𝑞"#Q. This inequality does 
not necessarily mean, as instead is assumed in stated choice surveys, that 𝑈"#) ≥ 𝑈"#Q. The discrepancy 
is to be found in the subjective features of resolvable uncertainty. Therefore, only when 𝑞"#)  = 1 is the 
subjective probability format in accordance with the assumption in stated choice analysis. This 
difference is more salient the closer resolvable uncertainty makes 𝑞"#) proximate to 0.5. For example, 
in a sample with 100 choice tasks in which  𝑞"#) = 0.6 will lead to only 60 of these selecting 
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alternative i, while in the stated choice analysis all 100 of them will be taken as selecting alternative i. 
Non-extreme subjective probabilities indicate belief of resolvable uncertainty, which respondents 
expect to solve in an actual choice. 
The next step is to estimate the subjective random utility model, which requires some standard 
assumptions analog to the assumptions made in the standard stated choice analysis. Now – assume that 
the 𝜀"#)L  is subjectively i.i.d. distributed Gumbel (as opposed to being objectively i.i.d. distributed in the 






,  j,i=1,…,J.         (5) 









          (7) 
which leads to:  
ln ij8;e
j8;c
k = ln i\]^(_`8
9 a8;e)
\]^(_`89 a8;c)
k = 𝛽"′(𝑥"#f − 𝑥"#C)       (8) 
So, simply regressing the log-odds on the internal product of coefficients and attribute differences 
leads to a linear probability model.  
Assume now that the single attribute coefficient is individual-specific because of an idiosyncratic 
component 𝜖", then 𝛽" = 	𝑏 + 𝜖": 
ln ij8;e
j8;c
k = (𝑥"#f − 𝑥"#C)𝛽" = (𝑥"#f − 𝑥"#C)(𝑏 + 𝜖") = (𝑥"#f − 𝑥"#C)𝑏 + (𝑥"#f − 𝑥"#C)𝜖",				 (9) 
Setting 𝑢"fC = (𝑥"f − 𝑥"C)𝜖"fC and ignoring t, the above collapses to: 
ln ij8e
j8c
k = (𝑥"f − 𝑥"C)𝛽" = (𝑥"f − 𝑥"C)(𝑏 + 𝜖") = (𝑥"f − 𝑥"C)𝑏 + 𝑢"fC,				   (10) 
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Without loss of generality, setting 𝐸(𝜖"|𝑥) = 0 by normalization, and taking expectations, one finds  
𝐸(𝑢"|𝑥) = 0 and 𝑏 = 𝐸(𝛽) thus making eq. (10) a linear mean regression model: 
𝐸 rln ij8e
j8c
k |𝑥s = (𝑥"#$ − 𝑥"#C)𝑏          (11) 
The above relationship implies that the mean value of the preference in this binary ECP model can be 
consistently estimated by OLS with only week distributional assumptions on the random 𝛽" =
(𝑏 + 𝜖"), which only require a null value of the conditional expectation. This is a much milder 
assumption than what is normally assumed in mixed logit with normally distributed coefficients, in 
which the required assumption is 𝜖"~𝜑(0, 𝜎). Note that in the latter a very specific type of symmetry 
is required around zero, determined by both the size of 𝜎 and the shape of the normal. No assumption 
about shape or 𝜎 is required in the ECP.  
Unfortunately, equation (11) may not be taken at face value under all empirical circumstances. A 
typical problem arises in the frequent instances in which respondents round elicited probabilities to the 
closest 5 or 10% (Manski, 2004; Manski and Molinari 2010). The problem is immaterial when the 
rounding takes place well within the (0,1) interval, but it becomes numerically serious if small 
subjective probabilities are rounded to 0 and large ones are rounded to 1, as the log-odds are very 
sensitive near the boundaries (0 and 1): in the extreme case they will end up providing log-odds of 
either plus or minus infinity, making OLS estimates computationally infeasible. As shown by Blass et 
al. (2010) this problem is solved if the preferences are symmetrically distributed around their median 
value, as is also assumed in many stated choice analyses using normal or equilateral triangular 
distributions of the random parameters. Such symmetry implies that the unobservable idiosyncratic 
component of the random coefficient vector ∆𝑥′𝜖" = 𝑢" in eq. (10) be symmetrically distributed with 
zero median, conditional on x. The linear median regression model is robust to extreme values and can 
be consistently estimated by using Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; 
Koenker and Hallock, 2001): 
 𝑀 rln ij8;e
j8;c
k |𝑥s = (𝑥"#f − 𝑥"#C)𝑏         (12) 
We take advantage of the property of the median (indeed any quantile) of a random variable being 
invariant towards any order-preserving transformation. This enables us to substitute reported values of 
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zero and one for values close to them, but in the interior of the (0,1) interval1, without affecting the 
consistency of the estimate of the mean value for the random coefficient, or 𝑏 in eq. (11).  
Because the LAD approach provides consistent and unbiased coefficient estimates, the derivation of 
marginal WTP for choice attributes at the mean/median values of the random coefficients is also 
straightforward and equals the (negative) ratio between the mean/median of any random coefficient for 
a given job characteristic and the mean/median of the random coefficient for the pecuniary attribute. 
This is resting entirely on symmetry assumptions similar to those invoked in the mixed logit with 
normally distributed random coefficients and fixed price coefficient, which is still very commonly 
employed in practice (see the review in Caputo et al. 2018). But it enables the estimation of the 
parameters of interest from probability data instead of choice data, without invoking parametric 
distributional assumptions beyond linearity. We also note that while the mean values may not exist in 
the sample or population, quantile values, such as the median, always exist. What may not exist is a 
respondent that holds the median value of the random coefficient at the numerator and the median 
value of that at the denominator at the same time, but this is a shortcoming that can also be attributed 
to mixed logit with normal random parameters for which this WTP measure is often used.  
2.3. A comparison of preference elicitation approaches: DCE vs ECP  
We compare the data obtained from the two independent samples treated with DCE and ECP 
elicitation formats in a number of different ways. After having tested for successful randomization of 
respondents between treatment groups using Chi-squared tests, we make descriptive comparisons of 
choices, and compare the perceived certainty of answers, measured in a follow-up question in the two 
treatment groups, where for “treatment” we intend the preference elicitation format: DCE and ECP. In 
the ECP treatment group, we also compare the degree of certainty by contrasting respondents who 
always stated probabilities of 0% and 100% with those who expressed at least some interior 
probabilities. We then compare the signs and significance of mean/median estimates across models. 
Note that RPL specifications can be estimated from both DCE and ECP2 data, while LAD models only 
from ECP data. We then test for differences in WTPs and for taste heterogeneity across treatments and 
 
1 To enable the log-odd computation, in the execution of the analysis of the data we transform reported ones and zeros to 
0.999 and 0.001, respectively. This does not affect the LAD estimates, which is invariant to truncation of extreme values. 
Note that in the text we follow Blass (2010) and refer to m as the “mean preferences” rather than the more correct “center 
of symmetry of the preference distribution”. 
2 The ECP choice data are recoded as one for alternatives with stated probability greater than 50%, and zero for stated 
probabilities below 50%. Choice tasks with subjective probabilities of 50% are excluded in this analysis. 
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models. Finally, we examine the predictive validity of the DCE and the ECP approaches by evaluating 
the forecasts of each of the models.  
In the DCE treatment, we forecast choice probabilities for all choice tasks and compare these with the 
actual choices using a threshold of 0.5, which is adequate for binary choices. The ECP forecast, 
instead, is deemed correct if both forecast and the stated probability assign more than 0.5 to the same 
alternative3. We report the percentage of correct predictions for both treatments. We perform the 
convergent validity test in three different ways:  
1) A within-respondent consistency test by comparing predicted choice probabilities with stated 
choices (using the RPL model in the DCE sub-sample4 and the LAD model in the ECP sub-
sample). 
2) A between-respondent consistency test across treatment groups by comparing probability 
forecast from the RPL model onto the ECP responses and probability forecast from the LAD 
for the DCE responses5. 
3) A between-respondent consistency test within each treatment group by comparing predicted 
choice probabilities obtained from a model estimated on a randomly selected subset of 85% of 
respondents with a hold-out subsample of actual choices/choice probabilities of the remaining 
15% of respondents.6  
3. Case study: Future physicians’ preferences for rural general practice 
Like many other countries, Denmark has been suffering from a shortage of general practitioners (GPs). 
This shortage is especially felt in rural areas, and the issue is unlikely to be alleviated in years to come. 
Designing policies to attract physicians (both future and existing) to rural areas has long been a crucial 
challenge for health economists and others, who have addressed it in the literature a number of times 
(Marchand and Peckham 2017). To shed light on the issue, previous studies used both choice 
experiments (see e.g. Scanlan et al. (2018), Holte et al. (2015) and Li et al. (2014)) and best-worst 
scaling (Günther et al. 2010). To date, the ECP approach has never been used in a health economics 
framework. 
 
3 The exact 50% responses have been removed for the purpose of this test. 
4 This approach is also used in Salampessy et al. (2015). 
5 If we find major differences in preference structure between the two approaches this test cannot be seen as a validity 
test. 
6 This approach is similar to the one used by Salampessy et al. (2015) except that they use 50% of the sample to make 
predictions of the choices made by the remaining 50% in a DCE setting.  
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3.1. Survey design and questionnaire 
The first section of the questionnaire included some preliminary questions about respondents’ place of 
study, preferred choice of medical specialty and general reasons for wanting to be a GP. The second 
section included the discrete choice/subjective choice probability experiment. This was followed by a 
question on perceived certainty in choices together with socio-economic questions. The questionnaire 
was pilot-tested on 21 medical students. No major changes were made following the pilot. 
Respondents are future medical doctors (medical students in their final years of study) and each was 
assigned 12 experimentally designed choice scenarios consisting of two alternatives (J = 2). Allocation 
to preference elicitation treatment was randomized based on their date of birth: even dates were 
allocated to the ECP, odd dates were allocated to the DCE. All other aspects of the experiment, 
including choice scenarios, were kept identical across treatments.   
Scenarios were described by seven attributes (see table A1 in appendix); two with four levels 
(population and yearly bonus), two with three levels (number of GPs in the practice and distance to 
closest family), and three with two levels (control over working hours, distance to leisure activities and 
job security for partner). Attributes and levels were chosen based on both a focus group and extant 
literature (e.g. Holte et al. 2014; Pedersen and Gyrd-Hansen 2014; Günther et al. 2010; Sivey et al. 
2012). Examples of the DCE and ECP treatments are displayed in figure A1 and A2 in appendix.  
During the focus group interview, attributes other than those in table 1 were explored and eventually 
discarded as of minor importance. Dismissed attributes included: professional development 
opportunities, workload, professional collaboration in the practice, distance to other career options, 
number of on-call duties, collaboration with other general practices, administrative work, continuity in 
care, and time for each patient. Resolvable uncertainty surrounding stated choice and pertaining to 
each of the excluded attributes may, to some extent, be resolved at the stage in which a real job choice 
is to be made. This suggests that in the present case study, resolvable uncertainty is present.  
Although respondents were presented with a forced choice, an ‘indifferent option’ was available in the 
DCE treatment. While this is unusual in DCEs practice, we allowed for this option to compare its 
frequency with the equivalent 50/50 option in the ECP elicitation. In the estimation of choice models 
from DCE data, observations expressing indifference between alternatives were dropped.  
12 
 
In the ECP treatment, respondents stated their subjective probability of choosing alternative A, the 
complement of which is the selection probability of alternative B. To help respondents provide us with 
an accurate probability of a choice, we used a visual aid in the form of a sliding probability scale 
ranging from 0%-100%. Using the slider bar, respondents could slide back and forth accurately 
signaling their subjective probability of job selection. The starting point of the slider was at 50-50 
percent, and respondents were forced to click on the slider before they could proceed to the next choice 
set. Previous papers (e.g. Dominitz and Manski 1997, Blass et al. 2010, Shoyama et al. 2013) used 
open-ended questions, but we feared that this could result into too abstract an exercise for respondents 
to comprehend. Moreover, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2002) argue that using open-ended questions 
induces respondents to over-state frequencies around 50%, due to the phrase “fifty-fifty”, which to 
many may not represent a true numeric probability of 50%, but rather some form of epistemic 
uncertainty (see also Bruine de Bruin et al. 2000, Bruine de Bruin and Fischhoff 2017 and Manski 
2017). To avoid this problem, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2002) show that by using an explicit numeric 
probability scale, as we did here, the issue of exaggerating probabilities of 50% is heavily reduced. 
The experimental design was a Bayesian D-error minimizing main effects design with priors estimated 
from a conditional logit model based on the incoming answers to a pilot test (n=21). The design was 
generated using the software Ngene (ChoiceMetrics 2009).  
3.2. Data collection 
Survey data were collected from postgraduate medical students in Denmark in October 2015 using 
internet forums specifically established for such students at the four universities in Denmark that 
educate physicians. The link to the questionnaire was distributed in these forums three times during the 
data collection process. In total, 316 respondents answered the questionnaire, of whom 167 answered 
the discrete choice questions, and 149 answered the choice probability questions.   
4. Results 
4.1. Test for successful randomization 
The test shows that randomization is successful on all observable characteristics except for 
respondents from Copenhagen University and Aarhus University (Table A2 in appendix). 
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4.2. Descriptive comparison of choices  
Figure 1 shows that in the DCE treatment, alternative A was chosen in 45.15 % of all choice sets, 
whereas alternative B was chosen in 46.49% of all choice sets. The indifferent option was chosen in 
8.37 % of choices. Removing from the DCE sample those observations stating indifference, caused the 
distribution to change to 49.27% for alternative A and 50.73% for B.  
 
Fig. 1. Distribution of choice frequencies for the DCE treatment including the indifferent option 
In the ECP treatment, qntA and qntB denote the stated choice probabilities in percent for alternative A 
and B, respectively, elicited from individual n in a given scenario t. The histogram for the elicited 
subjective choice probabilities for alternative B are shown in figure 2. For all cases, we have that qntA 
= 100-qntB.  
The histogram in figure 2 shows that most responses are multiples of 10, followed by multiples of 5, 
but that other percentages have also been chosen. Disregarding responses at 0% and 100%, the 
histogram displays a bimodality in choices with some concentration of responses around 20% (chosen 
4.39% of times) and 80% (chosen 3.79% of times). 
It is important to observe that extreme probabilities of 0% and of 100% have been chosen 7.46 % and 
7.68% of the times, respectively. In our proposed interpretation, both cases are equivalent to absence 
of resolvable uncertainty. So, about 85% of choices are indeed consistent with the simultaneous 
presence of both resolvable and unresolvable uncertainty, linked to scenario descriptions judged 
somewhat incomplete to allow for a definitive choice response. Put differently, by allowing an ECP 















obviously unavailable in a conventional DCE, which forces respondents to state only extreme 
probabilities of 0% and 100%. We note that these figures are comparable to those obtained in Blass et 
al. (2010), except for the frequency of 50%, which was more seldom selected in our survey. This was 
perhaps due to our use of the sliding scale, which would be consistent with the findings reported by 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2002). We further speculate it could also be due to the inherent comparatively 
higher ability of our educated respondents to discriminate and interpret the concept of probability.  
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of choice frequencies for alternative B in the ECP treatment 
For comparison with the DCE treatment, a reported subjective probability below 50% (corresponding 
to choosing alternative A while allowing for uncertainty) was chosen 47.78% of the times, while a 
probability above 50% (Corresponding to choosing Alternative B while allowing for uncertainty) was 
chosen 49.07% of the times. The 50-50 option was chosen only 3.02% of the times.  
4.3. Comparison of perceived certainty of choices across treatment groups  
Table 1 shows that, regardless of the elicitation treatment, in the follow-up question the majority of 
respondents state to be uncertain about their stated choice. Respondents in the ECP treatment are 
slightly more uncertain of their stated probabilities than respondents in the DCE treatment, but the 
difference is statistically insignificant. Hence, using an ECP rather than a DCE format does not seem 
to significantly affect the self-reported degree of certainty of responses.  
Amongst respondents in the ECP approach who provide interior probabilities, 56.57% said they are 
uncertain of their response, a percentage that goes up to nearly 69% amongst those only stating limit 
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 DCE ECP Pearson  
Chi2 test 
ECP  Pearson  
Chi2 test    Interior Zero-one 
 How certain are you of your choices in the last 12 questions? 
Very certain 0.60 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Certain 10.18 7.38  7.71 4.19  
Neither  31.14 28.19  28.99 20.36  
Uncertain 49.10 57.72  56.57 68.86  
Very uncertain 8.98 6.71 0.489 6.72 6.59 0.032 
Table 1 
Perceived certainty in choices 
4.4. Sign and significance of mean attribute preferences  
In RPL models, a random coefficient is deemed statistically insignificant if both its mean and standard 
deviation estimates are insignificant. In table 2 it is seen that for the DCE data this occurs for 
familycar, pop2 and pop25, suggesting that individuals on average are indifferent between having a 
short or a long car drive to their closest family relation; or having a practice within sparsely populated 
rural areas or mid-sized cities. On the contrary, in the set of pseudo-choices derived from the ECP 
sample (where we used a 50% cut-off), except for the gp2, all random coefficient estimates show 
significance in either the mean, standard deviation, or both. This suggests individuals are on average 
indifferent between a job in a practice alone or with one other GP. Although the signs of estimated 
coefficients are all concordant, it appears that the two sub-samples provide partially different patterns 
of preference heterogeneity. Moreover,  the average log-likelihood value for DCE data is 44% higher 
than for ECP,  suggesting a strong inherent difference in response mode. 
Table 3 presents estimates for the LAD model fitted to the ECP data. Results reveal no major 
differences on signs and significance of attribute coefficients, except for the coefficient for familybike, 
which in this data is insignificant, while we would expect it to be positive and significant. No further 
differences are found when these results are compared with the RPL model fitted to the ECP data 
(table 2).  
4.5. Comparison of marginal WTP estimates 
Table 4 shows that WTP estimates generally differ between econometric models (RPL vs. LAD) 
(WTP estimates appear in table A3 in the Appendix), but not so much between elicitation methods, 




Table 5 shows that for the within-respondent consistency test, the RPL estimates from DCE data (i.e. 
DCE(RPL)) have a 78% predictive validity (compared to 81% in Salampessy et al. (2015)), while the 
LAD model has a predictive validity of 75%. Values are reversed in the between-respondent 
consistency test across treatment groups, as the DCE(RPL) model has 75% predictive validity, and the 
LAD model 78%. In the between-respondent consistency test within treatment groups (using the hold-
out sample), the DCE(RPL) model correctly predicts 79% of choices (compared to 45% in Salampessy 
et al. (2015)), while the LAD model predicts 75% correctly. For the ECP(RPL) model the value is only 
70%. In conclusion, both RPL and LAD models have reasonable predictive performance – in the range 
of 75-79%. Bearing in mind that the econometrics of the LAD model is predicated on generally weak 
assumptions: apart from the assumptions necessary for the core logit probability, there is no specific 
parametric distribution assumed on the random parameters, except median independence and a zero 
median of the idiosyncratic departure from mean preference values. These assumptions are quite less 
restrictive, and hence more credible, than those invoked by standard RPL models based on parametric 
taste distributions. Nevertheless, it would seem that the predictive performance of the LAD model is 
quite good, and signs of estimates are concordant with those obtained from DCE data with a standard 
RPL model with normally distributed coefficients. 
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 DCE  ECP  
 Estimate St.err. |t-val| P-value Value St.err. |t-val| P-value 
µ ASC2 0.37 0.17 2.16 0.03 2.37 0.34 7.04 <0.001 
s ASC2 0.01 0.23 0.06 0.95 3.74 0.42 8.99 <0.001 
µ bonus1 0.68 0.11 6.41 <0.001 0.70 0.10 7.20 <0.001 
s bonus1 fixed    fixed    
µ control 2.63 0.50 5.29 <0.001 1.87 0.29 6.51 <0.001 
s control 1.17 0.25 4.76 <0.001 1.59 0.26 6.04 <0.001 
µ familybike 1.99 0.60 3.33 <0.001 0.94 0.35 2.68 0.01 
s familybike 0.56 0.27 2.07 0.04 1.45 0.24 6.15 <0.001 
µ familycar 0.31 0.84 0.37 0.71 0.99 0.40 2.47 0.01 
s familycar 0.59 0.85 0.69 0.49 0.03 0.33 0.08 0.94 
µ gp2 -9.96 4.71 2.12 0.03 -0.25 0.61 0.41 0.68 
s gp2 6.64 2.60 2.55 0.01 1.25 0.65 1.93 0.05 
µ gp34 3.95 1.01 3.91 <0.001 3.47 0.55 6.26 <0.001 
s gp34 5.98 1.66 3.60 <0.001 2.57 0.38 6.81 <0.001 
µ jobhigh 1.60 0.43 3.74 <0.001 2.26 0.39 5.79 <0.001 
s jobhigh 1.60 0.31 5.20 <0.001 2.22 0.32 6.87 <0.001 
µ pop2 -0.50 0.68 0.74 0.46 -1.29 0.41 3.19 <0.001 
s pop2 0.36 0.70 0.52 0.60 0.76 0.25 3.06 <0.001 
µ pop25 -0.47 0.61 0.78 0.44 -1.05 0.39 2.67 0.01 
s pop25 0.10 2.69 0.04 0.97 0.24 0.46 0.52 0.61 
µ pop510 -1.01 0.30 3.31 <0.001 -0.65 0.20 3.35 <0.001 
s pop510 0.04 0.64 0.07 0.95 0.03 0.26 0.12 0.90 
µ schoolbike 2.44 0.39 6.27 <0.001 1.58 0.25 6.45 <0.001 
s schoolbike 0.83 0.29 2.82 0.01 1.28 0.20 6.28 <0.001 
# obs 1851 1822 
LL -753.44 -1067.04 
Table 2 







 Coef. St.err. P-value 
ASC2/const 0.17 0.05 <0.001 
bonus 0.26 0.03 <0.001 
control 0.40 0.11 <0.001 
familybike -0.33 0.19 0.08 
familycar 1.92 0.19 <0.001 
gp2 0.62 0.30 0.04 
gp34 1.43 0.27 <0.001 
jobhigh 0.37 0.15 0.02 
pop2 -2.82 0.27 <0.001 
pop25 -2.33 0.26 <0.001 
pop510 -0.56 0.07 <0.001 





LAD (50% quantile) for the ECP treatment 
 
 RPL vs. LAD 
RPL(DCE) vs. 
RPL(ECP) 
 t-values P-value t-values P-value 
control 3.729 <0.001 1.916 0.055 
familybike 3.954 <0.001 1.767 0.077 
familycar 3.925 <0.001 0.672 0.502 
gp2 2.493 0.013 2.103 0.036 
gp34 2.044 0.041 0.635 0.525 
jobhigh 2.585 0.010 1.012 0.311 
pop2 1.765 0.078 0.878 0.380 
pop25 5.131 <0.001 0.716 0.474 
pop510 4.822 <0.001 1.234 0.217 
schoolbike 9.891 <0.001 2.134 0.033 
Table 4 




 Correct forecast 
Data(Model) On DCE data On ECP data 
15% Held out 
sample 
DCE (RPL) 77.90% 74.87% 78.90% 
ECP (LAD) 77.90% 74.87% 74.84% 
ECP (RPL) 72.02% 69.10% 70.40% 
Table 5 
Forecasting reported as hit rates of actual choices 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
For junior doctors, the decision of where to practice is important and it will in real life rely on a wealth 
of information. In consequence, in a stated choice context, they will be surrounded by much 
uncertainty. Incompleteness of choice scenarios is pervasive in stated choice experiments and 
generates uncertainty that is expected to be at least in some part resolved at the moment of actual 
choice. Such resolvable uncertainty is allowed to manifest itself in ECP. In our case, 85% of recorded 
choices showed some degree of incomplete scenarios. Such information can be used to expand policy 
options leading to better health care provision, for example by tackling those job factors wrapped in 
uncertainty.  
In terms of modelling, we find that the predictive validity of the LAD model estimated on ECP data is 
not far from that of the RPL model estimated on conventional DCE data. Our WTP estimates show 
significant differences between the two preference elicitation methods, as also found by Shoyama et al. 
(2013). Given that in our data the randomization of respondents across elicitation treatments was 
successful (except across universities), the observed differences are likely to be due to either the 
allowance of resolvable uncertainty being explicitly accounted for in the ECP data, or the different 
econometric model specifications, or the fact that underlying choice behavior changes with the 
different types of choice tasks posed. The mixed set of results obtained by these initial studies suggests 
there is some merit in further research based on more in-depth comparison of preference elicitation 
methods, possibly enriched by advances in psychology. This would help identify the operational and 
systematic sources of difference and to confirm possible empirical regularities. We report results with 
remarkable similarities in forecasting performance, despite the LAD model being both a less 
econometrically demanding approach in terms of estimation than RPL and reliant on less restrictive 
distributional assumptions on the data generating process. Apart from the standard assumptions for 
logit probabilities, these are essentially reduced to only symmetry around the median (to overcome the 
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issues of extreme subjective probabilities of 0 and 1 and probability rounding), along with the 
commonly invoked assumption of zero mean of the idiosyncratic terms in random utility coefficients. 
No parametric distributional assumption on taste is necessary (e.g. specific shape or size of variance). 
One could, however, argue that the LAD model should do an even better job in forecasting, since it 
takes resolvable uncertainty into account, but the reader has to bear in mind that the validity of the 
LAD model is assessed against a preferred alternative framework, where a correct forecast is obtained 
only if both the elicited choice probability and the observed choice probability are either below or 
above 50%. However, forcing the data from the ECP elicitation to fit into the frame of the preferred 
alternative approach might be too restrictive, as shown by the poor performance in fit of the RPL 
model when applied to ECP data. Furthermore, a clear limitation of the ECP-LAD approach is that the 
characterization of preference distributions in the ECP context requires long panels of choice 
repetitions by respondents (Blass et al. 2010). A further limitation is that it is unclear how to formulate 
a proper LAD model when choice tasks have more than two alternatives. Nevertheless, our results 
show that the LAD model predicts with similar accuracy to the conventional preferred alternative 
preference elicitation approach.  
The above limitations with the inherent difficulty of some profiles of respondents to understand and 
formulate subjective probabilities could hamper the wide-scale adoption of the ECP approach in 
preference survey research. The latter does not appear to be a problem for the medical students in our 
sample, although we cannot ignore the evidence of widespread misuse of statistical understanding in 
clinical practice (Eddy 1982, Cahan et al. 2003). The use of ECP elicitation could be expected to be a 
problem where the underlying population has a high prevalence of uneducated individuals or more 
generally for all those with low numeracy skills. We note that this has been investigated within the 
context of developing countries, where the rate of uneducated or less educated individuals is 
commonly expected to be large. Both Delavande and Kohler (2009) and Attanasio et al. (2005) find 
that the basic properties of probabilities are well understood by respondents from rural areas of 
developing countries. Bruine de Bruin and Fischhoff (2017) showed that more useful responses were 
elicited using the probabilities compared to using simpler terms, and the numerical probabilities 
revealed both construct and predictive validity. This was also found to be true for adolescents where 
the mean probability judgement was found to be close to observed rates. Moreover, when providing 
visual aids, there is evidence that even young children are able to understand probabilities (for a 
review on this, see Reyna and Brainerd, 1995). Thus, we argue that it would seem unjustified to 
disregard a-priori the ECP approach on this basis. We used a probability elicitation scale as a visual aid 
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to respondents. This may have contributed to a greater understanding of the probabilities, which is 
supported by the fact that fewer respondents chose the limit values of 0 and 1 compared to the study by 
Blass et al. (2010) where an open-ended question was used. However, in general, the distributions of 
probabilities were similar in the two studies. Nevertheless, more research on the presentation of 
different ECP approaches and its impact on choices is warranted. 
The use of probabilities can be argued to mimic the real market situation less accurately than discrete 
choices. Hence the realism of the choice tasks may be greater in the DCE framework as people often 
have to make discrete choices in actual choice contexts rather than choices based on probabilities. 
Hence, the ECP approach may provide the analyst with richer data but at the cost of realism. The effect 
of this limitation in terms of realism is also something that should be investigated further in future 
comparative work, especially focusing on its consequences in predicting real choice.  
Overall, and in line with Manski (1999) and Blass et al. (2010), we argue that using the ECP approach, 
when contrasted to the standard DCE approach, leads to a better understanding of sources of 
uncertainty on choice, but with the limitations discussed above. The availability of simpler models that 
while relying on weaker distributional assumptions provide just as valid predictions is conceptually 
appealing. Nevertheless, we feel that more research on reliability and validity of WTP estimates, and 
further comparisons of both probability elicitation scales and econometric approaches are needed to 
better understand the effects of choice probability elicitation and its link to the underlying choice 
behavior before one method can generally be recommended over the other in specific contexts of 
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Attributes Levels Variable labels 


















Distance to leisure activities, school and day care  Cycling distance 
Requires car / public transport 
Schoolbike 
Base 




Distance to closest family Cycling distance 
Short car ride 














 DCE ECP Pearson Chi2 test 
Gender    
Men 28% 28%  
Women 72% 72% 0.956 
University    
Aarhus University 58% 47%  
Aalborg University 15% 17%  
Copenhagen University 12% 25%  
University of Southern Denmark 15% 12% 0.022 
Length of study    
<= 4 years 41% 38%  
> 4 years 59% 62% 0.230 
Marital status    
Single 25% 28%  
Married 12% 9%  
Cohabiting 43% 46%  
Have a partner - not cohabiting 20% 16%  
Do not know 1% 1% 0.751 
Do you have a state education loan?  
Yes 37% 42%  
No 62% 58%  
Do not wish to disclose 1% 0% 0.284 
Do you have, or have you had a study-related job during your education? 
Yes 83% 85%  
No 16% 13%  
Do not wish to disclose 1% 1% 0.639 
What specialty do you expect to choose after becoming MD? 
Respondents could choose between 38 different specialties, where general 
practice was one of them (descriptive stats not displayed here) 0.783 
How probable do you consider it to be that you become a general practitioner? 
Very unlikely 10% 11%  
Unlikely 17% 17%  
Neither or 24% 27%  
Likely 35% 28%  
Very likely 15% 17% 0.720 
Could you consider taking a job in a rural area without getting economically compensated? 
Yes 52% 49%  
No 28% 27%  
Do not know 20% 24% 0.713 
Table A2 





 DCE ECP ECP 











control 389489 268971 156065 
 (49034) (39387) (38902) 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
familybike 295136 135386 -127116 
 (75400) (49903) (75615) 
 <0.001 <0.001 0.093 
familycar 45867 142586 742466 
 (127974) (65809) (122995) 
 0.72 <0.001 <0.001 
gp2 -1473800 -36193 240817 
 (678029) (88224) (116140) 
 <0.001 0.68 0.038 
gp34 584449 498417 240817 
 (121560) (59852) (116140) 
 <0.001 <0.001 0.038 
jobhigh 236521 325424 552286 
 (69309) (53950) (100581) 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
pop2 -73853 -186029 143227 
 (107710) (68603) (59306) 
 <0.001 <0.001 0.016 
pop25 -70068 -150497 -1089146 
 (93687) (62016) (175147) 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
pop510 -148780 -94070 -902008 
 (34686) (27613) (152316) 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
schoolbike 361555 227369 -217254 
 (49034) (39387) (31935) 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Table A3 
WTP estimates in DKK 
 
 
